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COMAMlENT
VARIANCE PROCEDURES UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT:
THE NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY
The failure of previous legislative efforts to alleviate the dangers to
the public health and welfare associated with expanding levels of air
pollution' prompted the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970.2 One of
the most striking and significant characteristics of the amended Act is
the enhanced status given federal authority in the effort to abate air pollution. Although the states retain a considerable degree of responsibility for the control of pollutants at their source,3 the role of the
federal government, particularly with respect to overseeing, and, where
1. See H.R. REP. No. 91-1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 5 (1970); S. REP. No. 91-1196,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-4 (1970). The Air Pollution Control Act, ch. 360, 69 Star.
322 (1955), was the first effort by Congress to control air pollution. Its most significant aspect was provision of assistance to state programs in the form of federal
research. This Act was significantly modified by the Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub.
L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963), amended in 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Star. 992,
and by the Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Star. 485 (1967). For a
discussion of some of the inadequacies of the Air Quality Act of 1967, see Greco,
The Clean Air Amendments of 1970: Better Automotive Ideas from Congress, 12 B.C.
IND. & Com. L. REv. 571, 581, 589 (1971); O'Fallon, Deficiencies in the Air Quality
Act of 1967, 33 LAW & CoNTEAL,. PROB. 275 (1969); Schroeder, Pollution in Pcrspective: A Survey of the Federal Effort and the Case Approach, 4 NAT. REsoURcES LAW.
381, 388-89 (1971).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858a (1970). Some of the more important aspects of the
amendments are discussed in Note, Clean Air Amendments of 1970: A Congressional
Cosmetic, 61 GEo. L.J. 153 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Congressional Cosmetic].
3. See Clean Air Act §§ 101(a) (3), 110, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857(a) (3), 1857c-5 (1970). Section 101(a) (3), enacted as part of the Clean Air Act of 1963, states that "the prevention and control of air pollution at its source is the primary responsibility of States
and local governments . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1857(a) (3) (1970) (emphasis supplied). The
continued validity of referring to the states' responsibility as "primary" appears questionable in light of the 1970 amendments. Although the states retain the initial responsibility for regulating emissions to the extent necessary to ensure attainment of
national ambient air quality standards, the amendments have increased federal initial
responsibility and eroded the corresponding state responsibility where emissions of
hazardous substances or emissions from new sources, motor vehicles, or aircraft are
involved; there also was a marked increase in the ultimate authority of the federal
government. See Clean Air Act §§ 111, 112, 202(a), 209(a), 231(a) (1), 233, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1857c-6, 1857c-7, 1857f-1, 1857f-6a, 1857f-9, 1857f-11 (1970); Frizzell, The Fedcral
Government and Environmental Litigation, 61 Ky. Lj. 1, 17 (1972); Luneburg, FederalState Interaction Under the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 14 B.C. IND. & Cozq. L.
Rlv. 637 (1973); Congressional Cosmetic, supra note 2, at 153.
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necessary, enforcing, state regulation of pollution sources, was increased
4
substantially.
The presence of overlapping state and federal authority should provide a more powerful deterrent to violations of the Act. Certain provisions of the amended Act, however, raise questions concerning the
proper interaction of state and federal authority, particularly in the
area of adoption and enforcement of state implementation plans. Prior to
the recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA,5 neither the extent
of a state's power to grant a variance permitting a source of pollution
to exceed the emission limitations contained in that state's implementation plan nor the responsibility of the federal government with respect
to state variance machinery had been subjected to judicial scrutiny.
In Natural Resources Defense Council, approval by the Administrator
of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of the implementation
plans of Rhode Island and Massachusetts was challenged. The plans
permitted state agencies to grant variances from the emission limitations
imposed by such plans after the date established by the Act for attainment of national ambient air quality standards. The court held the
Administrator's approval of the plans unwarranted, stating that after the
attainment deadline, the variance machinery provided by section 110(f)
of the Act is the exclusive remedy for a pollution source unable to
comply with its emission limitations.
Essential to an evaluation of the court's decision, which restricted the
permissibility of state variances to the preattainment period, is consideration of the competing interests involved in the granting of variances. Absent an adequate remedy, such as a variance, industries unable
to lower their emission levels sufficiently may be forced to close down;
widespread plant closings can significantly affect the economy and result in substantial unemployment. On the other hand, permissive variance procedures could completely emasculate the substantive provisions
of the Act and frustrate its purpose of protecting the public health and
4. Transfer of authority for establishment of ambient air quality standards to the
federal government and provisions in the amended Act requiring federal approval of
state implementation plans have substantially increased federal supervisory functions.
See notes 6-10 infra & accompanying text. Moreover, federal sanctions (including
substantial fines) may now be levied for any violation of a state plan without a prior
request for federal action by the state. Compare Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No.
90-148, 5 108(c) (4), 81 Star. 485 (1967), 'vth Clean Air Act § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8
(1970).

5. 478 F.2d 875 (Ist Cir. 1973).
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welfare from the dangers of air pollution. Discerning the manner in
which the amended Act attempted to resolve these conflicting interests
requires careful analysis of the statute and its legislative history. Concurrently, attention must be afforded the ramifications which it may be
expected will follow from a given interpretation.
The amended Act directs the Administrator of the EPA to promulgate national primary and secondary ambient air quality standards for
the major air pollutants.6 Primary standards define the maximum per-7
missible level of each pollutant compatible with the public health;
secondary standards are designed "to protect the public welfare from
any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence
of [a particular] air pollutant in the ambient air." 8 Upon establishment of national standards, each state must adopt and submit to the EPA
a plan providing for the "implementation, maintenance and enforcement" of the standards for each air quality region within the state.'
To ensure that state implementation plans offer viable methods of attaining the national standards, approval by the EPA Administrator is contingent upon his determination that they satisfy the criteria enumerated
in section 110 (a) (2) of the Act.'
An acceptable plan must include "emission limitations, schedules, and
timetables for compliance with such limitations, and such other measures
as may be necessary to insure attainment and maintenance" of primary
and secondary standards." This provision clearly delegates the responsibility for the development of a system of emission controls to the
states; however, nothing therein or in any other section of the Act specifies how the states are to determine the emission limits for any pollution
source. Attainment of national standards necessitates decisions concerning the degree of regulation of the various types of pollution
sources, and Congress apparently recognized the familiarity of the
states with the problems confronting individual industries within their
emission standards for
borders. Consequently, formulation of exact
2
states.'
the
to
left
was
polluters
individual
6. See Clean Air Act § 109(a) (1) (A), 42 U.S.C. S 1857c-4(a)(1)(A)

(1970).

7. Id. § 109(b) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4(b)(1) (1970).
8. Id.§109(b) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4(b) (2) (1970).
9. Id. §110(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (a) (1) (1970).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (2) (1970).
11. Clean Air Act § 110(a) (2) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (a) (2) (B) (1970).

12. See Hearings on Air Pollution Control and Solid Wastes Recycling Before the
Subcomm. on Public Health and Welfare of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 281 (1970) (statement of
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Section 110(a) (2) (A) requires each implementation plan to provide
for the attainment of primary standards "as expeditiously as practicable,
but
in no case later than three years from the date of approval of
such plan"; 13 various provisions of the Act have been interpreted as
mandating compliance with national primary standards by May 31,
1975.14 Secondary standards must be achieved within a reasonable time
after attainment of primary standards.' 5 Although the Administrator
is authorized to prevent violations "of any requirement of an applicable
John G. Veneman, Under Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare): "In general,

existing stationary sources of air pollution are so numerous and diverse that the
problems they pose can most efficiently be attacked by State and local agencies. Even
with air quality standards being set nationally, dealing with existing stationary sources
would necessarily vary from one State to another and, within States, from one area
to another." See also Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 1, 3-4 (3d Cir. 1973).
Regulations promulgated by the EPA provide that the states may consider the social
and economic impact of their actions when adopting their control strategies. 40 C.F.R.
§ 51.2(d) (1973).

13. Clean Air Act § 110(a) (2) (A) (i), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (2) (A) (i) (1970). An
acceptable plan must also establish procedures for monitoring pollution sources and for
reviewing the proposed location of new sources, include provisions for inter-governmental cooperation and assurances that the state will have adequate personnel, funding,
and authority to carry out the plan, and provide for inspection and testing of motor
vehicles as well as means to revise the plan. Id. 5 110(a) (2), 42 US.C. § 1857c-5(a) (2)
(1970).
14. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.2d 968, 970 (D.C.
Cir. 1973). Although the Act does not explicidy define a deadline for attainment,
that date may be determined by adding periods allotted various stages in implementing
its provisions. Under section 109(a) (1) (A), the Administrator had 30 days after
December 31, 1970, (date of enactment of the amendments to the Act) to issue proposed regulations prescribing the national ambient standards "for each air pollutant
for which air quality criteria had been issued prior to such date:' 42 U.S.C. § 1857c4(a) (1) (A) (1970). See Clean Air Act § 1OS(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-3(a) (1) (1970).
Within 90 days of the issuance of proposed national standards, the Administrator was
to promulgate such standards. Id. § 109(a) (1) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4(a) (1) (B) (1970).
Thus, the national standards were to be established, at the latest, by April 30, 1971. The
states had nine months from this date to submit their implementation plans to the
Administrator, that is, by January 31, 1972. Id. § 110(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (1)
(1970). Since the Administrator had four months to approve or reject the plans, it
was possible that all plans would have been accepted by May 31, 1972. Id. § 110(a) (2),
42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (2) (1970). Each state must attain the levels specified in its
implementation plan within three years of approval thereof, thus establishing May
31, 1975, as the mandatory date for compliance with the national primary standards.
Id. § 110(a) (2) (A) (i), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (2) (A) (i) (1970). Since, however,
the Administrator rejected several plans, necessitating a delay of several months for
approval of revisions, some plans provide for the attainment of national standards as
late as July 1, 1975. See, e.g., Michigan Plan, 40 C.F.R. § 52.117 (1973).
15. Clean Air Act § 110(a) (2) (A) (ii), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (2) (A) (ii) (1970).
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implementation plan," 16 the states have concurrent powers of enforce7
ment over those polluters covered by their plans.'
Two provisions of the Act expressly permitting extensions were intended to mitigate somewhat the exigencies of compliance with the May
31, 1975, deadline for national ambient air quality standards. Section
110(e),18 which permits the Administrator to grant an extension upon
application by the governor of a state at the time of submission of the
state's implementation plan, is no longer a factor, since all plans have
been submitted for purposes of this section. The proper interpretation
of section 110 (f),11 the only remaining express source of a variance from
the attainment deadline, 2 was a major issue confronting the court in
2
Natural Resources Defense Council. '
Designed to provide relief for pollution sources for which compliance
with emission levels as set forth in implementation plans appears impossible, section 110 (f) of the amended Act provides, in pertinent part:
Prior to the date on which any stationary source or class of
moving sources is required to comply with any requirement of
an applicable implementation plan the Governor of the State to
which such plan applies may apply to the Administrator to postpone the applicability of such requirement to such source (or
22
class) for not more than one year.
16. Id. § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8 (1970). Under this section, however, the enforcement powers of the federal government as to existing sources may not be exercised
unless the state of such source is notified and fails to initiate action within 30 days.
17. An acceptable plan must contain provisions demonstrating that the state has
the power to enforce the regulations and standards contained therein. 40 C.F.R.
5 51.11(a) (2) (1973). See Clean Air Act § 114(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-9(b) (1970).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(e) (1970).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (f) (1970).
20. It should be noted that the two extension procedures are not mutually exclusive.
Thus, a one year extension under section 110(f) could be granted to a polluter which
previously has received a two year extension under section 110(e). This possible combination of postponements could defer the mandatory compliance date for a qualifying
source to May 31, 1978. Greco, supranote 1, at 588.
21. The reasoning employed by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was
adopted in a similar challenge in the Eighth Circuit to the approval of the Iowa
implementation plan. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 483 F.2d
690 (8th Cir. 1973). Attacks upon state variance provisions are pending in other
circuits. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, No. 72-2402 (5th Cir.)
(Georgia plan); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, Nos. 72-2145,
72-2147 (9th Cir.) (Arizona and Washington plans).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(f) (1970). The criteria which must be met before a
section 110(f) variance will be granted are discussed in the text accompanying note
49 infra.
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In Natural Resources Defense Council, plaintiff, arguing that section
110(f) provides the exclusive variance mechanism once an implementation plan is submitted, contended that the Administrator erred in approving the Massachusetts and Rhode Island implementation plans insofar as those plans permitted the states to grant variances. In response,
the EPA asserted that section 110(f) was designed to be exclusive only
where a modification of an implementation plan would prevent the
attainment or maintenance of a national ambient standard.2 3 In support
of its construction of the section, EPA argued that its regulations, by
requiring that any variance granted by a state be treated as a "revision"
to a plan,21 eliminated any danger of frustration of the Act which
might result from indiscriminate granting of variances by the states.
Under these regulations, state variances have no effect upon the enforcement powers of the federal government until it is determined by
the Administrator 25 that the postponement of compliance with emission
23. The EPA contended: "In maintaining that interim changes to an implementation plan can be made only through Section 110(f), petitioners ignore both the
existence of the revision procedure of Section 110(a) (3) and the legislative history
of Section 110(f) itself." Brief for Respondent at 9, Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1973) (footnotes omitted).
24. These regulations provide:
A State's determination to defer the applicability of any portion(s) of the
control strategy with respect to such source(s) will not necessitate a
request for postponement under this section [110(f.)] unless such deferral
will prevent attainment or maintenance of a national standard within the
time specified in such plan: Provided, however, That any such determinadon will be deemed a revision of an applicable plan under § 51.6.
40 C.F.R. f 51.32(f) (1973). In a supplemental brief the Administrator argued that
section 110(a) (3) provided the statutory authority for treating state variances as
revisions of an implementation plan under his regulations and that EPA approval of
such revisions is expressly conditioned upon a finding that the attainment or maintenance of a national standard would not be adversely affected. Supplemental Brief
for Respondent at 2-7, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 478 F.2d
875 (1st Cir. 1973). On the other hand, the Natural Resources Defense Council contended that revisions may be granted only if they meet the requirements of section
110(a) (2) (H), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (2) (H) (1970). Consolidated Reply Brief for Petitioners at 4, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, supra. Under this
section, it was argued, revisions are permitted only to make a plan more restrictive
"to take account of new limitations and improved control method[s] . .. ." Id. The
petitioners maintained that § 110(a)(3) only provides the procedure to be employed
in revising a plan and that it has no bearing upon the types of alterations which are
permitted. id. at 5. For a thorough discussion of these arguments that appears, in
essence, to concur in the EPA construction, see Luneburg, supra note 3, at 649-59.
25. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.8 (1973); Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 342 F. Supp. 1006
(D. Del.), remanded with directions to dismiss-, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
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limitations would not interfere with the timely attainment or mainten26
ance of a national standard.

The issue at the heart of the parties' conflicting interpretations was
in what instances section 110(f) provides the exclusive procedure by
which a pollution source may obtain a variance. NRDC contended that
the precise criteria of that section must be met to receive any postponement of compliance with emission limitations set forth in an implementation plan; EPA maintained that section 110(f) is exclusive only if
national ambient standards would be affected adversely by the postponement sought. Implicit in the latter interpretation is recognition that
state variance machinery different from that delineated in section 110 (f)
may be utilized in instances in which the attainment or maintenance of
a national standard is not jeopardized.
Rejecting the contentions of both parties and adopting an interpretation of its own, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that
section 110(f) is "the only recourse provided those seeking postponements of a state's emission limitations after the mandatory deadline" of
mid-197 5,27 but that during the preattainment period, "the Administrator
has discretion-as he does not have after the mandatory dates-to permit
state and local deferral mechanisms not inconsistent with national objectives." 28 It was observed that "a state's implementation plan must
provide for two periods of time: an earlier period during which
attainment of primary standards is to be achieved ... and a later period
...

",
29
after which standards, having been attained, are to be maintained ....
The determination that the Act established two distinct periods, a
distinction the court then relied upon in deciding the applicability of

26. See note 24 supra.
27. 478 F.2d at 886. The court, however, recognized an exception in situations involving "mechanical breakdowns and acts of God." It was held that a state implementation plan could include extension procedures for such circumstances if they
provide for "specific time periods measured in weeks or a few months, and . . .
contain standards and controls precluding abuse." Id.
The Administrator subsequently promulgated the following regulation:
Notwithstanding the limitations of paragraph (b) (1) (ii) of this section,
a variance may be granted which provides for compliance beyond the
statutory attainment date for a national standard where compliance is not
possible because of breakdowns or malfunctions of equipment, acts of
God, or other unavoidable occurrences. However, such variance may not
extend for more than three (3) months unless the procedures and conditions set forth in section 110(f) of the Act are met.
40 C.F.R. § 52.1131(b) (2) (1973).
28. 478 F.2d at 887.
29. Id.at 885.
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section 110(f), was based upon provisions of the Act requiring implementation plans to provide for attainment of primary standards "as
expeditiously as practicable, but ... in no case later than three years"
of EPA approval" and to include "emission limitations . . . and such
other measures as may be necessary to insure attainment and maintenance of such . . . standard [s]." 31 Although the requirement that
a state plan provide for compliance within three years necessarily implies
that periods of time exist on either side of the deadline date, neither
section 110(f) nor any other provision of the Act makes an express
distinction between variance procedures before and after such date.
Moreover, nothing contained in the legislative history indicates that the
Administrator's power with respect to variances is to be determined by
reference to a pre- or postattainment period. 2
It may be, as the court stated, that Congress did not intend "altogether to preclude the Administrator from approving plans containing
reasonable state deferral mechanisms during the preliminary period" 11
and that the Administrator's power to approve such deferral mechanisms
stems from the need for statutory flexibility. The disturbing aspect of
the decision, however, is that the statutory flexibility found necessary
in the preattainment period was held not to exist after the deadline for
attainment of national standards. In support of its finding with respect
to the latter period, the court stated:
Congress's intention to restrict individual exemptions is further
reflected in its enactment of [section 110(f)]. That section with
its precise standards, its limitation of postponements to not more
than one year, and its provision for judicial review, would be
meaningless if much less restricted state variance machinery,
nowhere authorized by the federal statute, were simultaneously
to exist. We think Congress meant [section 110(f)] to be the exclusive mechanism for hardship relief after the mandatory attainment dates.3 4
30. Clean Air Act § 110(a) (2) (A) (i), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (a) (2) (A) (i) (1970).
31. Id. § 110(a) (2) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (2) (B) (1970) (emphasis supplied).
82. See H.R. REP. No. 91-1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); S. REP'. No. 91-1196,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). See also Hearings on Implementation of the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1970 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the
Senate Comm. on Public Works, 92d Cong, 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited as
OversightHearings].

33. 478 F.2d at 887.
34. Id. at 886.

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:324

It appears that the court construed the plain language of the statute
as evidence of a congressional desire to preclude fle.xibility during the
postattainment period.3" It was reasoned that "[h]ad Congress meant
[section 110(f)] to be followed only if a polluter, besides violating
objective state requirements, was shown to be preventing maintenance
of a national standard, it would bave said so." 36 Since, however, the
language of section 110(f) makes no distinction whatsoever betveen
preattainment and postattainment periods, it is more reasonable to conclude that Congress either intended section 10(f) to be exclusive in all
cases or contemplated the use of other variance mechanisms at any time

if the purposes of the Act were not frustrated.
The court's attempt to employ legislative history to buttress its conclusions with respect to the postattainment period also is subject to
criticism. It was asserted:
It is plain from the legislative history that the expeditious imposition of "specific emission standards" and their "effective enforcement" were primary goals of the Clean Air Amendments
[citing House report]. The Congressional intent could too easily
be frustrated by the existence of open-ended exceptions. Sources
of pollutants should either meet the standard of the law, or be
closed down [citing Senate report].3

The language in the House report upon which the court relied appears in the section of that report entitled "Need for Legislation." 38
Although not technically designated as a "primary goal" of the Act,39
the need for expeditious enforcement may be conceded to have been a factor motivating the amendment of the Act in 1970.40 The House report

justifiably recognizes that effective emission standards for individual
35. It may be argued, however, that the wording of the statute evokes precisely
the opposite construction. Luneburg, for example, makes a cogent argument that section
H0(f) is intended to apply only where a variance would prevent attainment of
national primary air quality standards by the mandatory deadline. This interpretation stems from the highly restrictive aspect of the substantive requirements of that
section and the presumed inability of most sources to sustain their burden of proof thereunder. See Luneburg, supra note 3, at 652-56.
36. 478 F.2d at 886 (emphasis supplied).
37. Id. at 885-86.
38. H.R. REP. No. 91-1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 5 (1970).
39. It appears that the primary goal in the Act's amendment was "to provide for
a more effective program to improve the quality of the Nation's air." CoNF. RE'. No.
91-1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970).
40. See, e.g., S. RE'. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970); H.R. REP. No. 91-1146,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 5 (1970); Greco, supra note 1, at 581.
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sources of pollution are necessary to guarantee attainment of national
standards. That report does not, however, state that such individual
standards may not be relaxed if a variance would not increase the aggregate level of emissions within a region to a point above the national
standard and if both state and federal authorities agree such a relaxation
is warranted.
Similarly, the Senate report does not support the court's determination
that section 110 (f) specifies the exclusive mechanism for variances in the
postattainment period. The court failed to consider what "standard"
that report stated a pollution source must meet or close down. The full
relevant passage of the Senate report is as follows:
In the Committee discussions, considerable concern was expressed regarding the use of the concept of technical feasibility
as the basis of ambient air standards. The Committee determined
that 1) the health of people is more important than the question
of whether the early achievement of ambient air quality standards
protective of health is technically feasible; and 2) the growth of
pollution load in many areas, even with application of available
technology, would still be deleterious to public health.
Therefore, the Committee determined that existing sources of
pollutants either should meet the standard of the law or be
closed down .... 41
It appears the report was referring to the necessity of compliance with
national ambient standards, rather than individual emission standards.
Nothing therein is inconsistent with the proposition that variances from
emission standards should be permitted unless national standards would
be imperiled.
The final argument advanced by the court as to the exclusivity of
section 110(f) during the postattainment period stresses the difficulty
of factually determining which variances will not affect national
standards:
Had Congress meant [section 110(f)] to be followed only if a
polluter, besides violating objective state requirements, was shown
to be preventing maintenance of a national standard, it would
have said so. To allow a polluter to raise and perhaps litigate
that issue is to invite protracted delay. The factual question could
have endless refinements: is it the individual variance-seeker or
others whose pollution is preventing maintenance of standards? 42
41. S. REP. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1970)

42. 478 F.2d at 886.

(emphasis supplied).
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It is submitted that the court's concern with the possibility of protracted delay in determining whether the granting of a variance would
jeopardize maintenance of national standards is not justified. Admittedly, the hearings on a proposed variance and subsequent appeals
may be time consuming; however, the polluter remains subject to enforcement actions until he proves that the variance would not adversely
4
affect maintenance of national standards.
Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine a more cumbersome and timeconsuming variance mechanism than that under section 110 (f), which,
under the court's holding, provides the exclusive procedure after the
attainment date. Before the Administrator may rule on the substantive
merits of any claim under that section, a pollution source seeldng an
extension must convince the governor of the state in which the source
is located to request the EPA to grant the extension. 44 Upon receipt of
such request, the determination of the EPA to grant or deny the variance
must be made "on the record after notice to interested persons and opportunity for hearing." 4 Regulations recently adopted by the EPA
require that a formal adjudicatory hearing be held before an administrative tribunal with a right of appeal to the Administrator and then to

the courts. 46 These substantial procedural requirements, although providing safeguards, necessarily involve considerable time and expense. It
is submitted that they should not be required unless the maintenance of

national standards would be jeopardized by the grant of the variance; 47
43. As illustrated in Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 342 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Del.),
renanded with directions to dismiss, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1125 (1973), where the federal government enforced an applicable portion of the
state's implementation plan during Getty's attempt to obtain a variance at the state
level, a request for a variance will not prevent state or federal enforcement until
it is approved by both governmental entities. Moreover, any concern with the difficulty
of determining whether the individual variance-seeker is the one preventing the maintenance of national standards is alleviated by placing the burden of proof on this issue
on the polluter; if it fails to meet its burden, the variance request will be denied. See
342 F. Supp. at 1011; 1 F. GRaD, TRaATis

ON ENVlRONmENTAL LAW § 2.03, at 2-76

(1973).
44. Clean Air Act § 110(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(f)(1) (1970). See note 22
supra & accompanying text.
45. Id. § 110(f) (2) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(f) (2) (A) (1970). See 1 F. GRAD,
supra note 43, § 2.03, at 2-75.
46. 40 C.F.R. § 51.33 (1973).

47. As one commentator has perceptively noted:
The substantial procedural safeguards that surround the Administrator's
determination to postpone the application of an implementation plan to
any stationary source or class of moving sources demonstrates that such a
postponement is to be regarded as an exceptional measure and that the Ad-
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where no such acute question is posed, the states should be free to

utilize less stringent variance procedures.
The procedural complexities involved in obtaining a section 110(f)
variance are exacerbated by the substantive criteria imposed by that
section. An extension beyond the attainment deadline for a pollution
source to meet the requirements of an implementation plan 4 may be
granted under section 110(f) only if it is demonstrated that:
(A) good faith efforts have been made to comply with such requirement before such date,
(B) such source (or class) is unable to comply with such requirement because the necessary technology or other alternative
methods of control are not available or have not been available
for a sufficient period of time,
(C) any available alternative operating procedures and interim
control measures have reduced or will reduce the impact of such
source on public health, and
ministrator's authority in granting such postponements is to be narrowly
construed.
I F. GRAD, supra note 43, § 2.03, at 2-75.
The argument that section 110(f) should not be construed as the exclusive variance
mechanism gains support from the testimony of Mr. Richard Ayres, an attorney for
the Natural Resources Defense Council, before a Senate committee reviewing the effectiveness of the 1970 amendments. Mr. Ayres stated:
To prevent State agencies from granting easy variances, the Clean Air
Amendments relied on two safeguards-the federal EPA and citizen pressure.
Under 5 110(f) of the Act, any variance which would prevent attainment
or maintenance of a national standard must go through elaborate justification and EPA approval. And under § 110(a) (3), any variance request
must be approved by the federal Administrator after being subjected to
public hearings.
Oversight Hearings,supra note 32, pt. 1, at 45 (footnote omitted).
In stating that the amendments were designed to prevent the states from granting
"easy variances" instead of any variances, Mr. Ayres was interpreting the Act in a
manner inconsistent with the construction advocated by NRDC in its challenge to the
Administrator's approval of the Massachusetts and Rhode Island plans. Furthermore,
it appears that this statement indicates that Mr. Ayres construed "the elaborate justification" mandated by section 110(f) to be necessary only where the variance would
prevent attainment or maintenance of national standards, which was the position advanced by the Administrator during the First Circuit case.
48. Since the Act's inception, confusion has surrounded the number of one year
extensions available to any one pollution source. See Discussion of Air Quality Control,
5 NAT. REsOuRcES LAW. 193, 202 (1972). It is arguable that since the House-Senate
Conference Committee deleted language from the original Senate version of section
111 expressly authorizing consecutive one year extensions, each pollution source should
be permitted a single one year extension. See Greco, supra note 1, at 588.
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(D) the continued operation of such source is essential to national
security or to the public health or welfare .. .. 49
Although the first three of these criteria do not appear unreasonable,
the requirement that the source be "essential to national security or to
the public health or welfare" would seem to remove the availability of
the section from a large number of industrial concerns, even upon a
broad construction of the phrase "public health or welfare." Under an
interpretation that section 110(f) is an exclusive remedy, numerous
firms, unable to meet emission limitations, could be forced to close,
notwithstanding that their continued operation would not adversely
affect attainment or maintenance in their region of national standards.
Such a result appears unduly harsh, particularly in the absence of an
explicit manifestation of congressional intent on the question.
The political ramifications associated with accession by a governor
to a request under section 110(f) raise further considerations as to
whether that section should be construed as an exclusive remedy. Substantial pressures from environmentalist organizations likely will be
attendant upon any such request, even if the variance at issue would not
adversely affect attainment or maintenance of national standards. A
more reasonable construction of the statute would preserve the possibility of alternative variance procedures where national standards are
not jeopardized.
Significantly, the national ambient air quality standards established
under the Clean Air Act are only necessary minimums;"0 the states are
in no way discouraged from setting stricter standards within their
regions. Section 116 requires only that a "State or political subdivision
may not adopt or enforce any emission standard or limitation which is
less stringent" than those required in implementation plans to attain
and maintain national standards." In fact, ithas been recognized that the
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(f) (1) (1970).

50. This congressional policy is reflected by the statutory provisions for revisions,
which may be made whenever the present national standards prove inadequate, Clean
Air Act §§ 109(b), 110(a) (2) (H), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-4(b), 1857c-5(a) (2) (H) (1970),
and by the policy of "non-degradation" followed in regions where air quality is substantially above the national standard. Such regions may not permit deterioration in
the quality of the air without approval of the Administrator. See Sierra Club v.
Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 4 BNA E.R.C. 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
aff'd by an equally divided Court sub nom. Fri v. Sierra Club, 93 S.Ct. 2770 (1973).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1857d-1 (1970).
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Act and the regulations thereunder implicitly encourage the states to
52
adopt stricter standards.
The holding of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Natural
Resources Defense Council, however, would seem to fashion a compelling argument against state adoption of regional emission limitations
stricter than those required for attainment and maintenance of national
standards. If a state were to provide in its implementation plan for
maximum emission levels for individual polluters more stringent than
those required to meet national standards, a pollution source, under the
interpretation of the First Circuit, would find that the only means by
which it could obtain a variance would be through the restrictive provisions of section 110(f), even though such source has been able to lower
its emissions sufficiently to ensure that the region will be in compliance with national standards.
A postdeadline revision procedure such as that struck down by the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit could prevent this anomalous
result. An ambitious state would have the opportunity to seek higher
levels of air quality than those required by the federal program without
the fear of severely penalizing certain of its industries should they fall
short of compliance with its stricter standards; thus, one bar to greater

state initiative would be removed. Concern about overly permissive variance procedures would be alleviated by continued EPA supervision to
ensure that minimum standards of air quality are met. Flexibility is essential to efficient administration of a national program of such scale as that
to improve the quality of the ambient air. It is submitted that restric-

tive interpretation of variance procedures under the Clean Air Act
unduly interferes with such flexibility.

52. Natural Resources Defense Council spokesman Richard Ayres specifically referred to the right of states to adopt more stringent standards at the 1972 Oversight
Hearings: "It is clear in the act itself that States are not only free but encouraged to
set tighter standards and reach these standards at an earlier date than required by
Federal law. A good many States have done it." Oversight Hearings, supra note 32,
pr. 1, at 17. Indeed, many states have required secondary standards to be attained at
the same time as primary standards. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. 5 52.575 (1973) (metropolitan
Atlanta).
53. Although the initial opportunity for states to establish air quality standards
more stringent than national standards has passed, the opportunity for revisions by
the states remains and will present itself again whenever the Administrator revises
the national standards.

